Fear, conservatism and out-group attitudes: a genetic link?

Australia’s eight-month election campaign is apparently underway. It’s a prospect that excites only those shady consultants, pollsters and party power-brokers whose livelihoods depend on running focus groups, devising strategies and pulling political strings.

Instead of ignoring the whole show, I have been reading up on insights that biology can provide into an election campaign. Perhaps some political consultants will want to gratuitously overpay me to talk about this stuff at some posh lunch or dinner?

For more than 60 years, psychologists have probed the underpinnings of variation in political opinion and, especially, left-right differences. Ten years ago, a meta-analysis of 88 studies across 12 countries and over 22,000 cases showed that political conservatism is strongly predicted by local instability of conditions, as well as an individual’s anxiety about death, inability to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty, needs for order and structure, fear of threat and loss.

Conservatives are also less open than other people to new experiences and have somewhat lower self esteem, on average.

New developments in personality psychology, evolution and neuroscience have added to what we know about the left-right divide. Last year’s interminable American election campaign unleashed a slew of studies and books concerning the ways in which biology shapes politics, campaigning, and election outcomes. A lot of the research documents differences between Republicans and Democrats. Some of the insights are peculiar to the US. Others provide general perspectives on the reflexes and intuitions underpinning conservative or progressive political identities.

Last year, in this column, I touched several times on the biological underpinnings of political opinion:



Cooperation with members of one’s own group, and mistrust of strangers who are not part of one’s own group, provides a central tension in all human social living. This tension constitutes the origin of xenophobia as well as its mirror-twin: zealous nationalism or patriotism.

Some new research adds considerably to our understanding of the relationships between fear, feelings toward out-group members and left-right political attitudes, as well as to why not everybody responds to fear in the same way.

Peter K. Hatemi and colleagues report in the American Journal of Political Science that people more disposed to social fears tend also to be less tolerant of immigrants and people of other races, and they identify more often as politically conservative. That’s old news. What sets this paper apart is that it comes from a study of nearly 30,000 people in over 8,636 families. And this allowed the authors to explore how genetic relatedness and shared environment shape the associations between fear, out-group attitudes and political conservatism.

Some 62% of the association between fear and conservatism was due to shared genetic origins, and 75% of the association between fear and negative attitudes toward outgroups came from a shared genetic basis. This makes the associations much more powerful than mere correlations: it suggests that the genes that dispose individuals to fear also tend to dispose them toward conservative attitudes, especially a mistrust of out-groups.

How these associations develop with experience, and why these traits share so much of their genetic basis remain to be tested. Just because two traits share considerable genetic variation does not mean political attitudes are fixed by some nightmarish determinist destiny. The associations between fear and attitudes grew weaker, in this study, in more educated individuals.

People’s political identities and attitudes are built from a bewildering number of environmental and genetic sources. I predict than in time the interactions between environment and genotype will be exposed as complex and shifting.

One thing I noticed from the first figure in the AJPS paper (see below) is that low fear levels don’t reveal much about a person’s politics. Low-fear people can be found across the political spectrum. But high-fear people tended to be universally conservative.


As Rose McDermott, the study’s second author put it:

It’s not that conservative people are more fearful, it’s that fearful people are more conservative.

Stay vigilant

Politicians have always known that they could channel the fears of voters for short-term electoral gain. I recall from my teenage years in South Africa how, whenever P.W. Botha’s apartheid government seemed vulnerable, they, and the state broadcaster, would revert – entirely without subtlety – to emphasising “swart gevaar” (Afrikaans for “black danger”).

In Australia, as in many other parts of the world, immigration and the issue of refugees stokes out-group fear. And one can be certain that politicians will provide a rich supply of oxygen to those fears over the coming campaign.

Conservative thought has plenty to offer, and there are usually many good reasons to consider conservative ideas. But politicians who cynically prod the fear reflexes of their constituents to tap into their ancient prejudices are sacrificing the public good for their personal gain. And they should be challenged and ridiculed when they do it.

Hopefully, an emerging understanding of exactly how the well-worn links between fear and voter conservatism work can be used to blunt the effectiveness of scaremongering politicians. And perhaps an understanding of how promoting and valuing rational thought can be used to elevate the quality of our politics?

Not for the first time, I think Noel Turnbull’s recommendations from an article he published at Crikey.com last year bear quoting in full:

One way to encourage the slower, more rational thoughts, which also encourage our better angels is very much in the hands of politicians. For instance, if it was left to a vote capital punishment would never have been abolished in many Western countries but politicians took the leap on moral grounds helped by extensive public campaigns.

When politicians reverted to pro-capital punishment atavism, such as former Victorian Liberal opposition leader Alan Brown, their leadership came under threat. In contrast one of his successors, Jeff Kennett, was extraordinarily principled on questions such as race and just refused opportunities to add to the fires and the atavistic comments while publicly demonstrating a strong commitment to multiculturalism.

Rob Brooks does not work for, consult to, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has no relevant affiliations.

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New ideas on the genetics and evolution of homosexuality

When I give talks about the relevance of evolution to modern life, I can count on one regular question interrupting an orderly transition from lecture theatre to bar. Sometimes it comes with a “bet-you-didn’t-think-of-that-one” sneer. Far more often it is asked earnestly and with palpable empathy. The Question?

How do you explain homosexuality?

The very real fact that a large proportion of people across the world are sexually attracted to members of the same biological sex provides a giant obstacle to a Darwinian view of life.

And I am always happy to field this question because it allows me to explore, with the audience, some of the layered complexity of evolution. But a simple, definitive answer remains, for now, beyond reach. That may start to change, however, with a paper published today in The Quarterly Review of Biology.

Born this way

Evolutionary biology can be a bit of a blunt instrument. Especially when it seeks to explain big, categorical differences – like sex differences. Focusing at a broad scale means a lot of nuance and individuality gets ignored or trampled. Which is why so many authors – quite unfairly – write off all biology as determinism.

Fortunately, biological ideas about homosexuality tend to be more welcome than biological ideas about, say, gender. That may be because so many gay people strongly feel they were “born this way”. And because ideas about homosexuality being a choice or a curable condition proliferate in all but the most enlightened places.

But being “born this way” isn’t necessarily the same thing as the traits involved being genetically determined. Genetic claims require genetic evidence. In support of a genetic basis, sexual orientation has a moderate to high heritability. Heritability being the statistic that describes how much of the variation in a trait is due to genetic differences among individuals.

But despite the statistical vapour-trail indicating a substantial genetic basis, the search for major genes involved in homosexuality has been far less fruitful. And then there remains the problem so beloved of seminar questioners. How could any such genes have persisted through millenia of selection if they lead to sexual preferences that do not produce offspring?

The idea that “gay people don’t have children” is simplistic and, historically, wrong. Being gay does not necessarily mean not having a family, and throughout history many – perhaps most – homosexuals spent time in heterosexual unions, having children. And yet even if a small proportion did not, this could have exerted strong evolutionary selection against any genes involved.

But perhaps those genes provided some other kind of evolutionary advantage that outweighed the direct cost of having fewer kids. Here, theories lie thick upon the ground. First, there is the idea that homosexual relatives provide exceptional help to their heterosexual relatives who are raising families. Any genes that raise the chances of homosexuality, then, are passed on through relatives. And the extra help means more nieces and nephews carrying those genes.

The second group of ideas hinges on the idea is that genes that make reproductively successful females can impose costs when they find themselves expressed in males. And the opposite can happen for genes that enhance male fitness. Some support for this idea exists as well, including evidence that families in which females tend to be highly fertile also have a higher proportion of gay men than one might expect by chance.

And Brendan Zietsch has written here about his own work showing that psychologically feminine men and psychologically masculine women who are heterosexual also tend to be more sexually attractive. He argues that genes that raise the chances of an individual being same-sex attracted also massively raise the mating success of heterosexual bearers being reproductively successful.

Each of these ideas has some empirical support, but not such strong support that the case can be closed. It remains likely that there is no single explanation and that several biological influences together shape sexual orientation.

The new idea

But today’s big story is an entirely new idea that hinges not on traditional genetics but instead on epigenetics. The fact that gene expression is modified by molecules that attach to particular genes, but can later be removed, is revolutionising almost every biological field, including evolution.

Genetics defies metaphors, but I’ll try to mangle one for folks who prefer J.K. Rowling over modern molecular genetics. If we think of a person’s DNA as a recipe book – say Advanced Potion Making by Libatius Borage – then the epigenetic marks (or epi-marks) are the annotations and corrections made in pencil by the owner. Epi-marks have many functions, many of them tailoring the DNA instructions to suit the circumstances in which an individual finds him- or herself.

Most epi-marks get erased before the recipe is copied and handed down to an individual’s offspring. But that isn’t always the case. Sometimes there are good adaptive reasons why offspring inherit epi-marks from a parent. And sometimes, like Harry Potter inheriting the Half-Blood Prince’s potions book, they receive annotated instructions that were not intended for them.

Bill Rice, Urban Friberg and Sergey Gavrilets recognised that epi-marks are an essential component of sex differentiation. Males and females share an entire genome and so development is fraught with instructions intended for embryos of one sex but not the other. One class of epi-marks protects female foetuses from the masculinizing effects of fetal testosterone. Another protects male foetuses from being feminized when oestrogen signals would otherwise trigger female development.

Different genes are involved in the development of genitals, reproductive organs, body shape, sexual orientation and every other trait where genes shape sexual differentiation. And so epi-marks to these different genes will have different influences on those traits.

Mostly, these kinds of epi-marks should not be passed from parent to offspring. But occasionally some are. And when the epi-marks on genes that effect sexual orientation get passed from father to daughter then some traits that would normally develop in female-specific ways end up more masculinized. Likewise mother-son transmission of epi-marks can result in the feminization of some traits that would normally develop in a more masculinized fashion.

I should stresss that the new paper is a mathematical model showing that this scenario can work. The authors marshal plenty of circumstantial evidence that it probably does work. But the idea needs to be directly tested.

Apart from the fact that this is one of those rare ideas that completely changes how we look at the evidence, I am most exited by the way this idea reframes how we look at sexual development. I suspect that this idea will, in time, also shake up the science of sex-differences and our understanding of how gender arises.

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